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BEST EVIDENCE RULE 
Paul C. Giannelli 
>-0::: 
Albert J. Weatherhead Ill & Richard W. Weatherhead 
Professor of Law, Case Western ReseNe University 
~ Article X of the Ohio Rules of Evidence sets forth the 
requirements of the "best evidence" rule. Rule 1002 
CO states the rule- to prove the contents of a writing, recording 
....J or photograph, the original must be introduced at trial 
> unless a statute or another rule recognizes an exception. 
> Rules 1003 to 1007 specify exceptions. Rule 1002 must ::5 be read in conjunction with Rule 1001, which_d~fines the 
terms writing, recording, photograph, and ongmal. 
:J Rule 1002 is consistent with prior Ohio law. See 
0:::: Gennaro Pavers, Inc. v. Kosydar, 42 Ohio St.2d 491, 330 ?: N.E. 665 (1975); Sinks v. Reese, 19 Ohio St. 306 (1869); 
U Hine v. Dayton Speedway Corp., 20 Ohio App.2d 185, 
187, 252 N.E.2d 648 (1969); City Club of Toledo, Inc. v. 
Board of Liquor Control, 3 Ohio App.2d 339, 341, 210 
N.E.2d 726, 728 (1964) ("Secondary evidence is never 
admitted unless it is made manifest that that which is 
better cannot be obtained."). 
APPLICATION OF RULE 
Rule 1002 applies only to writings, recordings, and 
photographs, and then only when a party seeks to prove 
their contents. There is no general rule requiring the 
"best evidence." For example, a party may offer testimo-
ny describing an object without being required to offer 
the actual object into evidence. See United States v. 
Figueroa, 618 F.2d 934, 941 (2d Cir. 1980)(heroin); Chan-
dler v. United States, 318 F.2d 356, 357 (10th Cir. 
1963)(whiskey jars); Holle v. State, 26 Md. App. 267, 274, 
337 A.2d 163, 166 (1975)(stolen marked currency). 
Thus, a more apt description of the rule is the "original 
writing" rule. See McCormick, Evidence§ 229 (3d ed. 
1984). The Ohio cases are in accord. See State v. 
Maupin, 42 Ohio St.2d 473, 330 N.E.2d 708 (1975) (best 
evidence rule does not apply to physical evidence); . 
Napolet v. Board of liquor Control, 67 Ohio Abs. 108, 119 
N.E.2d 93 (App. 1953). 
The special nature of writings gives rise to their being 
singled out for application of this rule. The copying of a 
writing is especially susceptible to the introduction of 
inaccuracies, and even a minor inaccuracy may have 
significant legal consequences. See 4 Wigmore, 
Evidence§ 1181 (Chadbourn rev. 1972). 
Public Defender Hyman Friedman 
Proving the Contents of a Writing 
The rule applies only when a party attempts to prove 
the contents of a writing or recording. Some events and 
transactions, such as those involving deeds, cont;acts, 
and judgments, are essentially written transactions, and 
the rule requires production of the original writing. See 
Toledo v. Tucker, 99 Ohio App. 346, 133 N.E.2d 411 (1954) 
(testimony regarding contents of agency regulation 
inadmissible). 
The rule, however, does not apply when the event 
sought to be proved existed independently of a writing. 
For example, if an accused makes an oral confession 
which is recorded or subsequently reduced to writing, 
the rule does not require the production of the recording 
or writing. The prosecution is not attempting to prove the 
contents of the recording or writing, but rather the 
independent event (oral confession) that happened to be 
recorded. See also State v. James, 41 Ohio App.2d 248, 
325 N.E.2d 267 (1974) (telephone conversation could be 
proved by testimony of person who received call or by 
tape recording of the call); American Security Service, 
Inc. v. Baumann, 32 Ohio App.2d 237,289 N.E.2d 373 
(1972) (account could be proved by testimony of witness-
es or by records); McCormick, Evidence§ 233 (3d ed. 
1984) ("evidence of a payment may be given without 
production of the receipt, or evidence of a marriage with-
out production of the marriage certificate."). The trial 
court, however, has authority to require production of the 
writing or recording pursuant to Rule 611(A), which 
recognizes the court's general authority to control the 
presentation of evidence. 
The original document rule also applies where a party 
chooses to introduce a writing to prove a fact that could 
be proved without the writing. Thus, in the confession 
example cited above, if the prosecution chose to use a 
writing to prove the confession, it would have to offer the 
original writing. A copy of the writing or testimony by a 
witness who read the written confession would be inad-
missible unless the original was unavailable. 
The Advisory Committee's Note to Federal Rule 1002 
contains the following comment: 
Application of the rule requires a resolution of the 
Telephone (216) 443-7223 
Cuyahoga County Public Defender Office, 1200 Ontario Street, Cleveland, Ohio 44113 
The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Public Defender. 
Copyright @ 1991 Paul Giannelli 
question whether contents are sought to be proved. 
Thus an event may be proved by nondocumentary 
evidence, even though a written record of it was made. 
If, however, the event is sought to be proved by the 
written record, the rule applies. For example, payment 
may be proved without producing the written receipt 
which was given. Earnings may be proved without 
producing books of account in which they are entered. 
McCormick§ 198; 4 Wigmore§ 1245. Nor does the rule 
apply to testimony that books or records have been 
examined and found not to contain any reference to a 
designated matter. 
Photographs 
Rule 1002 provides that the original photograph is 
required to prove the contents of the photograph. Rule 
1001(2) defines photographs to include X-ray films, video-
tapes, and motion pictures. In most cases, however, 
photographs are not offered to prove their contents. The 
Advisory Committee's Note to Federal Rule 1002 explains: 
The assumption should not be made that the rule 
will come into operation on every occasion when use is 
made of the photograph in evidence. On the contrary, 
the rule will seldom apply to ordinary photographs. In 
most instances a party wishes to introduce the item 
and the question raised is the propriety of receiving it 
in evidence. Cases in which an offer is made of the 
testimony of a witness as to what he saw in a photo-
graph or motion picture, without producing the same, 
are most unusual. The usual course is for a witness on 
the stand to identify the photograph or motion picture 
as a correct representation of events which he saw or 
of a scene with which he is familiar. In fact he adopts 
the picture as his testimony, or, in common parlance, 
uses the picture to illustrate his testimony. Under these 
circumstances, no effort is made to prove the contents 
of the picture, and the rule is inapplicable. Paradis, The 
Celluloid Witness, 37 U.Colo.L.Rev. 235, 249-251 (1965). 
On occasion, however, situations arise in which 
contents are sought to be proved. Copyright, defama-
tion, and invasion of privacy by photograph or motion 
picture falls in this category. Similarly as to situations 
in which the picture is offered as having independent 
probative value, e.g. automatic photograph of bank 
robber. See People v. Doggett, 83 Cai.App.2d 405, 188 
P.2d 792 (1948), photograph of defendants engaged in 
indecent act; Mouser and Philbin, Photographic Evidence 
- Is There a Recognized Basis for Admissibility? 8 
Hastings L.J. 310 (1957). The most commonly encoun-
tered of this latter group is of course, the X-ray, with 
substantial authority calling for production of the 
original .... 
DEFINITIONS: WRITINGS, ORIGINALS, 
AND DUPLICATES 
Application of the original writing rule requires that 
terms such as writing, original, and duplicate be defined. 
Rule 1001 contains the definitional provisions for Article X. 
Writings and Recordings 
Rule 1001(1) defines writings and recordings broadly to 
include writings produced from modern photographic 
and computer systems. Rules 1001(2) defines photographs 
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to include X-ray films, video-tapes, and motion pictures. 
The Advisory Committee's Note to Federal Rule 1001 
comments: 
Traditionally the rule requiring the original centered 
upon accumulations of data and expressions affecting 
legal relations set forth in words and figures. This 
meant that the rule was one essentially related to writ-
ings. Present day techniques have expanded methods 
of storing data, yet the essential form which the infor-
mation ultimately assumes for usable purposes is 
words and figures. Hence the considerations underly-
ing the rule dictate its expansion to include computers, 
photographic systems, and other modern developments. 
Originals 
Rule 1001(3) defines an original as the writing or 
recording itself or any "counterpart intended to have the 
same effect by a person executing or issuing it." Hence, 
the test for determining whether a counterpart is an origi-
nal is the intent of the person executing or issuing the 
writing or recording. This represents a change in Ohio 
law. See Chrismer v. Chrismer, 103 Ohio App. 23, 144 
N.E.2d 494 (1956) (carbon copy not separately executed 
is not an original); Comment, Duplicate Originals and the 
Best Evidence Rule, 19 Ohio St. L.J. 520 (1958). 
Rule 1001(3) contains a specific provision on computer-
generated writing: "any printout or other output readable 
by sight, shown to reflect the data accurately, is an 'origi-
nal.'" See Touche Ross & Co. v. Landskroner, 20 Ohio 
App.3d 354, 356,486 N.E.2d 850, 852 (1984). 
The Advisory Committee's Note to Federal Rule 1001 
contains the following comment: 
In most instances, what is an original will be self-
evident and further refinement will be unnecessary. 
However, in some instances particularized definition is 
required. A carbon copy of a contract executed in 
duplicate becomes an original, as does a sales ticket 
carbon copy given to a customer. While strictly speaking 
the original of a photograph might be thought to be only 
the negative, practicality and common usage require that 
any print from the negative be regarded as an original. 
Similarly, practicality and usage confer the status of 
original upon any computer printout. Transport Indem-
nity Co. v. Seib, 178 Neb. 253, 132 N.W.2d 871 (1965). 
Duplicates 
Rule 1001(4) defines a duplicate as a counterpart 
produced by a process "which accurately reproduce[s] 
the original." Thus, handwritten copies are not duplicates. 
If a counterpart, no matter how produced, is intended by 
the person executing or issuing it to have the same effect 
as the original, the counterpart is an original under Rule 
1001(3). A counterpart, therefore, may be either an origi-
nal or a duplicate, depending on the intent of the person 
executing or issuing it. The rule must be read in conjunc-
tion with Rule 1003, which provides that "duplicates" are 
generally admissible on the same basis as originals. 
The Advisory Committee's Note to Federal Rule 1001 
comments: 
The definition describes 'copies' produced by 
methods possessing an accuracy which virtually 
eliminates the possibility of error. Copies thus 
produced are given the status of originals in large 
measure by Rule 1003, infra. Copies subsequently 
produced manually, whether handwritten or typed, are 
not within the definition. It should be noted that what is 
an original for some purposes may be a duplicate for 
others. Thus a bank's microfilm record of checks 
cleared is the original as a record. However, a print 
offered as a copy of a check whose contents are in 
controversy is a duplicate .... 
ADMISSIBILITY OF DUPLICATES 
Rule 1003 governs the admissibility of "duplicates," as 
defined in Rule 1001(4). It is sometimes called the "Xerox" 
rule, because it makes Xerox copies generally admissible. 
Rule 1003 changes prior Ohio law. Under prior law the 
offering party had the burden of establishing an adequate 
excuse for failing to produce the original before secon-
dary evidence could be admitted. Rule 1003 reverses 
this burden for duplicates as defined in Rule 1001(4); not 
all copies qualify as duplicates under that provision. 
Duplicates are admissible unless "(1) a genuine question 
is raised as to the authenticity of the original or (2) in the 
circumstances it would be unfair to admit the duplicate in 
lieu of the original." 
The Advisory Committee's Note to Federal Rule 1003 
contains the following commentary: 
When the only concern is with getting the words or 
other contents before the court with accuracy and 
precision, then a counterpart serves equally as well as 
the original, if the counterpart is the product of a meth-
od which insures accuracy and genuineness. By defi-
nition in Rule 1001(4), supra, a "duplicate" possesses 
this character. 
Therefore, if no genuine issue exists as to authenti-
city and no other reason exists for requiring the origi-
nal, a duplicate is admissible under the rule .... Other 
reasons for requiring the original may be present when 
only a part of the original is reproduced and the remainder 
is needed for cross-examination or may disclose 
matters qualifying the part offered or otherwise useful 
to the opposing party. United States v. Alexander, 326 
F.2d 736 (4th Cir. 1964). And see Toho Bussan Kaisha, 
Ltd. v. American President Lines, Ltd., 265 F.2d 418, 76 
A.L.R.2d 1344 (2d Cii. 1959). 
The House Judiciary Committee added the following 
comment: "The Committee approved this Rule in the 
form submitted by the Court, with the expectation that 
the courts would be liberal in deciding that a 'genuine 
question is raised as to the authenticity of the original.' " 
H.R. Rep. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), reprinted 
in [1974] U.S. Code Gong. & Ad. News 7075, 7090. 
In National City Bank v. Fleming, 2 Ohio App.3d 50, 
440 N.E.2d 590 (1981), the court wrote: 
A party seeking to exclude a duplicate from the 
evidence pursuant to Evid. R. 1003 has the burden of 
demonstrating that the duplicate should not be admit-
ted. Under this rule, a determination as to whether 
such duplicate should be admitted is within the sound 
discretion of the trial court, and unless it is apparent 
from the record that the decision of the court is 
arbitrary or unreasonable, the determination will not be 
disturbed on appeal. /d. at 57. 
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EXCEPTIONS 
As discussed above, Rule 1003, the "Xerox" rule, 
carves out an exception for duplicates. Evidence Rule 
1004 specifies four additional conditions under which 
production of an original is not required. If any of the 
conditions specified in Rule 1004 are satisfied, secon-
dary evidence is admissible. The rule does not prescribe 
the type of secondary evidence that must be produced. 
For example, if an original is lost, secondary evidence in 
the form of a copy or in the form of the testimony of a 
witness is permitted. The copy is not preferred. The Advi-
sory Committee's Note to Federal Rule 1004 explains: 
The rule recognizes no "degrees" of secondary 
evidence. While strict logic might call for extending the 
principle of preference beyond simply preferring the 
original, the formulation of a hierarchy of preferences 
and a procedure for making it effective is believed to 
involve unwarranted complexities. Most, if not all, that 
would be accomplished by an extended scheme of 
preferences will, in any event, be achieved through the 
normal motivation of a party to present the most 
convincing evidence possible and the arguments and 
procedures available to his opponent if he does not. 
Compare McCormick § 207. 
Originals Lost or Destroyed 
Rule 1004(1) provides that secondary evidence is 
admissible if all the originals are lost or destroyed, 
provided that the offering party has not lost or destroyed 
the originals in bad faith. According to the House Judici-
ary Committee Report, "loss or destruction of an original 
by another person at the instigation of the proponent 
should be considered as tantamount to loss or destruc-
tion in bad faith by the proponent himself.'' H.R. No. 650, 
93d Gong., 1st Sess. (1973), reprinted in [1974] U.S. Code 
Gong. & Ad. News, 7075, 7090. 
The rule is consistent with prior Ohio law. See R.C. 
1217.41 (copy of business record admissible if original 
"destroyed or otherwise disposed of in good faith in the 
regular course of business"); Gennaro Pavers, Inc. v. 
Kosydar, 42 Ohio St.2d 491, 330 N.E.2d 665 (1975) 
(carbon copies admitted where originals destroyed in 
fire); Lessee of Blackburn v. Blackburn, 8 Ohio 81 (1837); 
Lessee of Allen v. Parish, 3 Ohio 107 (1827); Hine v. Dayton 
Speedway Corp., 20 Ohio App.2d 185, 252 N.E.2d 648 
(1969); Bevis v. American Railway Express Co., 17 Ohio 
App. 73 (1922); Weisenberg v. State, 12 Ohio App. 272, 
274 (1920) (secondary evidence inadmissible without proof 
that reasonable diligence had been exercised to secure 
production of original); Cities Services Oil Co. v. Dayton 
Reliable Motors, Inc., 44 Ohio Abs. 559, 65 N.E.2d 727 
(App. 1943) (insufficient proof that sales slips were lost). 
Original Not Obtainable 
Rule 1004(2) provides that secondary evidence is 
admissible if no original can be obtained by any available 
judicial process or procedure. The Advisory Committee's 
Note to Federal Rule 1004 elaborates: 
When the original is in the possession of a third 
person, inability to procure it from him by resort to 
process or other judicial procedure is a sufficient 
explanation of nonproduction. Judicial procedure 







taking of a deposition in another jurisdiction. No 
further showing is required. See McCormick§ 202. 
The rule is consistent with prior Ohio law. See Fosdick 
v. Van Horn, 40 Ohio St. 459 (1884) (secondary evidence 
admissible if originals out of state and beyond jurisdic-
tion of the court); Reed v. State, 15 Ohio 217 (1846) 
(secondary evidence admissible if original is in foreign 
jurisdiction beyond reach of subpoena power); Falardeau 
v. W.H.H. Smith Co., 13 C.C.(NS) 268, 21 C.C. 649 (1909) 
(secondary evidence inadmissible due to lack of attempt 
to subpoena original). 
Original in Possession of Opponent 
Rule 1004(3) provides that secondary evidence is 
admissible if the opposing party fails to produce the origi-
nal at trial, despite having been put on notice while the 
original was under his control that the contents of the 
original would be subject to proof at trial. Notice may be 
by pleadings or otherwise. 
The Advisory Committee's Note to Federal Rule 1004 
contains the following commentary: 
A party who has an original in his control has no need 
for the protection of the rule if put on notice that proof 
of contents will be made. He can ward off secondary 
evidence by offering the original. The notice procedure 
here provided is not to be confused with orders to 
produce or other discovery procedures, as the purpose 
of the procedure under this rule is to afford the oppo-
site party an opportunity to produce the original, not to 
compel him to do so. McCormick § 203. 
In Railway Co. v. Cronin, 38 Ohio St. 122 (1882), the 
Supreme Court held that "where a written instrument is 
in the hands of an adverse party, its contents cannot be 
proved by parol until its production has been called for 
and refused. There are, however, ... three well-estab-
lished exceptions to this general rule, and in which notice 
to produce is not necessary .... Thirdly, where, from the 
nature of the action, the defendant has notice that the 
plaintiff intends to charge him with possession of the 
instrument." /d. at 125. See also Choteau v. Raitt, 20 Ohio 
132 (1851) (syllabus, para. 2) ("A notice given to produce 
a paper, claimed to be in the possession of the party to 
whom notice is given, is not, as a general rule, a reasona-
ble notice, unless given before the trial of the cause, in 
which said paper is wanted, is commenced."); Johnson v. 
Stedman, 3 Ohio 94, 97 (1827) ("It is a common practice 
to receive parol evidence of the contents of a deed or 
other instruments of writing, where the deed or instru-
ment ... is in the possession of the opposite party, if 
notice has first been given to produce it."); Janchar v. 
Cerkvenik, 35 Ohio App. 519, 172 N.E. 634 (1930). 
Collateral Matters 
Rule 1004(4) provides that an original is not required 
with respect to collateral matters, that is, matters "not 
closely related to a controlling issue." The Advisory 
Committee's Note to Federal Rule 1004 comments: 
"While difficult to define with precision, situations arise 
in which no good purpose is served by production of the 
original. Examples are the newspaper in an action tor the 
price of publishing defendant's advertisement, Foster-
Holcomb Investment Co. v. Little Rock Publishing Co., 
151 Ark. 449, 236 S.W. 597 (1922), and the streetcar 
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transfer of plaintiff claiming status as a passenger, Chicago 
City Ry. Co. v. Carroll, 206 Ill. 318, 68 N.E. 1087 (1903). 
Numerous cases are collected in McCormick§ 200, p. 
412, n. 1." 
There are few Ohio cases on this issue. See Babcock 
v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America, 42 Ohio Abs. 271, 
280, 60 N.E.2d 495 (App. 1944) ("The rule is well recog-
nized that where writing is pertinent to a question under 
consideration, the writing itself is the best evidence.") 
(emphasis added). 
PUBLIC RECORDS 
Rule 1005 provides for the admissibility of copies of 
official records and recorded documents, thus recogniz-
ing an automatic exception from the requirements of the 
original writing rule. This exception is consistent with the 
treatment of public records throughout the Rules of 
Evidence. For example, Rule 902, which governs authen-
tication of documents, makes most pubic records "self-
authenticating." In addition, Rule 803(8) recognizes a 
hearsay exception for public records. The end result of 
these rules is that certified copies of public records are 
often admissible without the need to call a witness. 
The Advisory Committee's Note to Federal Rule 1005 
contains the following commentary: 
Public records call for somewhat different treatment. 
Removing them from their usual place of keeping 
would be attended by serious inconvenience to the 
public and to the custodian. As a consequence judicial 
decision and statutes commonly hold that no explana-
tion need be given for failure to produce the original of 
a public record. McCormick§ 204; 4 Wigmore§§ ~ 
1215-1228. This blanket dispensation from producing 
or accounting for the original would open the door to 
the introduction of every kind of secondary evidence of 
contents of public records were it not tor the prefer-
ence given certified or compared copies. Recognition 
of degrees of secondary evidence in this situation is an 
appropriate quid pro quo for not applying the require-
ment of producing the original. 
The rule is consistent with prior Ohio law. See Civ. R. 
44 (certified copies of domestic and foreign official 
records); R.C. 121.20 (certified copies of official records); 
R.C. 1701.92 and 1702.53 (certified copies of articles of 
incorporation and record of corporate minutes); R.C. 
2317.42 (certified copies of official reports); R.C. 5301.43 
(certified copies of deeds); Lessee of Sheldon v. Coates, 
10 Ohio 278,282 (1840) ("All public documents which 
cannot be removed from one place to another, may be 
authenticated by means of a copy, proved on oath to 
have been examined with the original."); State v. Smith, 
55 Ohio App.2d 202, 380 N.E.2d 353 (1977). 
SUMMARIES 
Rule 1006 provides that the "contents of voluminous 
writings, recordings, or photographs which cannot 
conveniently be examined in court may be presented in 
the form of a chart, summary, or calculation." The Advi-
sory Committee's Note to Federal Rule 1006 contains the 1~ 
following comment: "The admission of summaries of 
voluminous books, records, or documents offers the only 
practicable means of making their contents available to 
judge and jury. The rule recognizes this practice, with 
appropriate safeguards.'' 
The rule is consistent with prior Ohio law. See R.C. 
2317.36 (reports of experts); Petticrew v. Petticrew, 98 
Ohio App. 260, 129 N .E.2d 194 (1953), appeal dismissed 
;by 161 Ohio St. 118 (1954); Heiser Brothers Co. v. Cleveland, 
44 Ohio App. 560, 186 N.E. 620 (1932); McNaughton v. 
Presbyterian Church of Coshocton County, 35 Ohio App. 
443, 172 N.E. 561 (1930); Accurate Die Casting Co v. 
Cleveland, 68 Ohio Abs. 230, 113 N.E.2d 401 (App. 1953). 
Requirements 
Rule 1006 explicitly provides for two safeguards. First, 
the originals or duplicates must be made available for 
inspection and copying by the other parties. Second, the 
court may order the originals or duplicates produced in 
court. 
Case law imposes additional requirements. For example, 
a summary is not admissible if the originals upon which it 
is based are inadmissible. See Horning-Wright Co. v. 
Great American Ins. Co., 27 Ohio App.3d 261,263,500 
N.E.2d 890 (1985); State Office Systems, Inc. v. Olivetti 
Corp. of American, 762 F.2d 843, 845 (10th Cir. 1985); 
Paddack v. Dave Christensen, Inc., 745 F.2d 1254, 1259 
(9th Cir. 1984). In other words, Rule 1006 is only an 
exception to the original writing rule; it is not an exception 
to the hearsay rule. The underlying documents must 
qualify as business records, Rule 803(6), public records, 
Rule 803(8), or be otherwise admissible. 
Similarly, because Rule 1006 is an exception to the 
original writing rule, it does not apply to verbal state-
ments. "[T)here is no provision for the admission of 
summaries of the testimony of out-of-court witnesses.'' 
United States v. Goss, 650 F.2d 1336, 1344 n.5 (5th Cir. 
1981). 
Implicit in the rule is the requirement that the summary 
accurately summarize the original documents. A number 
of cases have excluded proffered summaries on this 
basis. See Needham v. White Labs, Inc., 639 F.2d 394, 
403 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 927 (1981) (summary 
of medical articles excluded because expert had not read 
all of the articles); United States v. Sorrention, 726 F.2d 
876, 884 (1st Cir. 1984) (summaries of figures excluded 
because "there was virtually no documentation."). 
The use of summaries often requires expert testimony. 
See United States v. Kaatz, 705 F.2d 1237, 1245 (10th Cir. 
1983). Rule 702 governs the qualifications of experts. 
Expert testimony, however, is not always required when 
summaries are introduced. See United States v. Jennings, 
724 F.2d 436, 443 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1227 
:1984) ("When a chart does not contain complicated 
:::alculations requiring the need of an expert for accuracy, 
'lO special expertise is required in presenting the chart."). 
Pedagogical Aids to Jury 
The use of sumaries or charts as evidence must be 
jistinguished from the use of summaries and charts as 
)edagogical devices. A summary admitted under Rule 
1006 is itself evidence and should go to the jury room 
~long with other exhibits. Charts and other visual aids 
hat merely summarize or organize testimony or docu-
nents that have already been admitted in evidence are 
lot themselves evidence and should not be sent to the 
ury room. See United States v. Possick, 849 F.2d 332, 
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339 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 213 (1989); Pierce 
v. Ramsey Winch Co., 753 F.2d 416, 431 (5th Cir. 1985). 
Business records 
The advent of computer-generated business records 
has sometimes caused confusion between Rule 1006 
and the business records exception to the hearsay rule, 
Rule 803(6). For example, computer printouts of a busi-
ness ledger kept on a computer are the actual records, 
not summaries, and thus Rule 803(6) controls, not Rule 
1006. United States v. Catabran, 836 F.2d 453, 457 (9th 
Cir. 1988). Similarly, the retrieval of data stored on a 
computer, as opposed to a selective compilation of random 
pieces of data, are business records, not summaries. 
United States v. Sanders, 749 F.2d 195, 199 (5th Cir. 1984). 
Additional Problems 
Summaries should be carefully scrutinized by the 
adverse party. One ABA report highlights the problem: 
The use of summaries has become an integral part of 
complex litigation. Yet, in such cases, summaries 
rarely 'summarize' in a neutral fashion. 
Within the frequently complicated calculations 
which may underlie them, such summaries are often 
replete with assumptions (and, commonly, arguments) 
concerning factual or legal matters which are the 
subject of vigorous dispute. Due to the sophistication 
and expertise of the preparers, moreover, such 
assumptions (or arguments) may well be unascertaina-
ble except upon very close scrutiny. ABA Section of 
Litigation, Emerging Problems Under the Federal 
Rules of Evidence 344 (1983). 
United States v. Seelig, 622 F.2d 207 (6th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 449 U.S. 869 (1980), illustrates this point. It 
involved the prosecution of three pharmacists for 
improperly dispensing drugs. The prosecution offered a 
sales chart comparing the defendants' sale of certain 
items with those of eight other pharmacies. On appeal, 
the Sixth Circuit ruled the summary inadmissible because 
there had been no attempt to compare the stores: "The 
record does not show these other stores were the same 
size, covered the same marketing area, were open the 
same hours, had pharmacists on duty at all times, had 
the same access to the public, or most importantly, 
charged the same prices- all of which could have 
significantly affected the volume of sales.'' /d. at 215. 
ADMISSIONS 
Rule 1007 recognizes an exception to the original writ-
ing rule where the party against whom the contents of a 
writing, recording or photograph is offered admits the 
contents. The rule is limited to admissions that are in 
writing or are part of the testimony or deposition of the 
party. This limitation was not recognized by the prior Ohio 
cases. See Edgar v. Richardson, 33 Ohio St. 581 (1878). 
The Advisory Committee's Note to Federal Rule 1007 
explains the decision to limit the exception: 
While the parent case, Slaterie v. Pooley, 6 M. & W. 
664, 151 Eng. Rep. 579 (Exch. 1840), allows proof of 
contents by evidence of an oral admission by the party 
against whom offered, without accounting for non-
production of the original, the risk of inaccuracy is 
substantial and the decision is at odds with the 
purpose of the rule giving preference to the original. 
See 4 Wigmore § 1255. The instant rule follows 
Professor McCormick's suggestion of limiting this use 
of admissions to those made in the course of giving 
testimony or in writing. McCormick§ 208, p. 424. The 
limitation, of course, does not call for excluding evidence 
of an oral admission when nonproduction of the origi-
nal has been accounted for and secondary evidence 
generally has become admissible. Rule 1004, supra. 
Accordingly, oral admissions may be admissible if the 
original cannot be produced under Rule 1004. They 
would not be admissible under Rule 1007. 
FUNCTIONS OF JUDGE AND JURY 
Rule 1008 specifies the functions of the court and jury 
in applying the requirements of the original writing rule. 
Under most circumstances, the court decides prelimi-
nary questions concerning the applicability of the rule. 
See Rule 104(A). This part of the rule is consistent with 
prior Ohio law. See Lessee of Blackburn v. Blackburn, 8 
Ohio 81 (1837). In Hine v. Dayton Speedway Corp., 20 
Ohio App.2d 185, 252 N.E.2d 648 (1969), the court wrote: 
"The quantum and quality of proof required for the 
admission of secondary evidence is not gauged by a 
uniform rule, but rests largely within the discretion of the 
trial court." /d. at 188. See also Sprang v. Doench, 3 Ohio 
Abs. 752 (C.P. 1925). 
The second part of the rule recognizes three circum-
stances in which the jury, rather than the court, decides 
the issue. These circumstances arise in cases in which 
"an issue is raised (a) whether the asserted writing ever 
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Existed, or (b) whether another writing, recording, or 
photograph produced at the trial is the original, or (c) 
whether other evidence of contents correctly reflects the 
contents." This provision represents a specialized appli-
cation of Rule 104(8) on conditional relevancy. 
The Advisory Committee's Note to Federal Rule 1008 
elaborates: 
Most preliminary questions of fact in connection with 
applying the rule preferring the original as evidence of 
contents are for the judge, under the general principles 
announced in Rule 104, supra. Thus, the question 
whether the loss of the originals has been established, 
or of the fulfillment of other conditions specified in 
Rule 1004, supra, is for the judge. However, questions 
may arise which go beyond the mere administration of 
the rule preferring the original and into the merits of 
the controversy. For example, plaintiff offers secondary 
evidence of the contents of an alleged contract, after 
first introducing evidence of loss of the original, and 
defendant counters with evidence that no such 
contract was ever executed. If the judge decides that 
the contract was never executed and excludes the 
secondary evidence, the case is at an end without ever 
going to the jury on a central issue. Levin, Authentica-
tion and Content of Writings, 10 Rutgers L. Rev. 632, 
644 (1956). The latter portion of the instant rule is 
designed to insure treatment of these situations as 
raising jury questions. The decision is not one for 
uncontrolled discretion of the jury but is subject to the 
control exercised generally by the judge over jury 
determinations. See Rule 104(b), supra. 
See generally Morgan, The Law of Evidence, 1941-45, 59 
Harv. L. Rev. 481,490-91 (1946). 
